UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

1-11-2012

State v. Caldwell Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38515

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Caldwell Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38515" (2012). Not Reported. 181.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/181

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDJl HO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
RICHARD MYERS CALDWELL,
Defendant-Appellant.

__________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COPY

NO. 38515

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

HONORABLE RANDY J. STOKER
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DE FEN DANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................ ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ................... 1
ISSUES ............................................................................................................3
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................4
I.

II.

Caldwell's Claim That Denial Of His Motion To
Augment The Appellate Record With Irrelevant
Items Was A Due Process Or Equal Protection
Violation Is Without Merit ........................................................... .4
A.

Introduction ......... ...........................................................4

B.

Standard Of Review ......................................................... 5

C.

Caldwell Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional
Entitlement To The Requested Augmentations ............... 5

Caldwell Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial
Of Caldwell's Rule 35 Motion And Request For
Appointment Of Counsel Because The District
Court Correctly Decided That The Motion For
Reconsideration Of The Sentence Was Frivolous .................... 11
A.

Introduction .................................................................... 11

B.

Standard Of Review ....................................................... 12

C.

Because Caldwell's Rule 35 Motion Was
Frivolous, The District Court Did Not Err By
Denying The Motion Or The Request For Counsel. ....... 12

CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................... 15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

PAGE

Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971) ......................................................... 8
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) .................................................... 5, 7
Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms
and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958) .................................................. 5
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) ..................................................................... 5
Huerta v. Huerta, 127 Idaho 77, 896 P .2d 985 (Ct. App. 1995) ............................ 9
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) .................................................................... 5
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) ................................................................... 5
Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 148,438 P.2d 893 (1968) ......................................... 6
Mayerv. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) .................................................... 7
Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 828 P.2d 1323 (Ct. App. 1992) ........................ 12
Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2002) ............................................................ 6
State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 79 P.3d 734 (Ct. App. 2003) ......................... 5
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007) ........................... 6, 10, 13
State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374,859 P.2d 972 (Ct. App. 1993) ........................... 9
State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 448 P .2d 229 (1968) ............................................ 5
State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 23 P.3d 786 (Ct. App. 2001) ................................ 5
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 50 P.3d 472 (2002) ................................... passim
State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 873 P.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1994) ........................... 12
Swisher v. State, 129 Idaho 467, 926 P.2d 1314 (Ct. App. 1996) ...................... 12
United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90 (1st Cir. 2002) ............................................. 6

iii

STATUTES

LC.§ 19-852(b)(3) .............................................................................................. 12

iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Richard M. Caldwell appeals from the denial of his Rule 35 motion for
reconsideration of the sentences imposed upon multiple counts of lewd conduct
with a child and sexual abuse of a minor.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Caldwell, with a wife in Utah, carried on a three year extra-marital affair
with Virginia Reed in Idaho. (PSI, p. 7.) During that time he repeatedly sexually
touched Reed's daughter, starting when she was about 11; he and Reed sexually
touched the daughter together; and Caldwell and Reed gave the daughter and
two of her young friends alcohol and then engaged them in manual-genital
touching and oral sex on more than one occasion. (PSI, pp. 2-3, 18-25, 56-57. 1)
A grand jury indicted Caldwell on three counts of lewd conduct with a child
and five counts of sexual abuse of a minor for multiple sexual acts or solicitations
with the three child victims, aged 12 to 14. (R., pp. 9-14.) Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Caldwell pied guilty to two counts of lewd conduct. (R., pp. 82-91.)
He later, however, was allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., pp. 110-11, 12930.) Caldwell proceeded to trial where he was convicted of two counts of lewd
conduct with a child and five counts of sexual abuse of a minor. (R., pp. 191-93.)
The district court imposed seven concurrent sentences of twenty years with three
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Page numbers of attachments to the PSI are referenced sequentially to the
numbered pages of the PSI.
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years fixed. (R., pp. 228-35.) Caldwell did not appeal from entry of judgment.
(See generally R.)
Seventy-seven days after entry of judgment Caldwell filed a Motion for
Correction or Reduction of Sentence, ICR 35. (R., pp. 255-65.) Caldwell also
requested appointment of counsel to pursue his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp. 26971.) The district court denied both motions without a hearing. (R., pp. 286-89.)
Caldwell filed a notice of appeal timely from the denial of his Rule 35 motion and
motion for appointment of counsel. (R., pp. 303-08.)
On July 15, 2011, Caldwell moved to augment the record with a previously
unrequested transcript of the trial in this case, a previously prepared transcript of
the grand jury proceedings in this case, and several documents (the PSI, PSE,
APSI, and sentencing transcript) from Reed's criminal case. (Motion to Augment
and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule.)

None of these documents and

transcripts had been presented to the district court in this case. (See generally
R.) Although the Idaho Supreme Court granted the motion to augment in relation

to the grand jury transcript, it denied the motion in all other respects.

(Order

Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule (8/25/11).)
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ISSUES
Caldwell states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Caldwell due process
and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment
the record with various transcripts and exhibits, which were
relied on by the district court at sentencing and in its
disposition of his I.C.R. motion?

2.

Did the district court err when it determined that Mr.
Caldwell's request for counsel in regard to his Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 motion was frivolous?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Caldwell's Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence in
light of the financial and emotional hardships caused by his
sentence and the negative impact his sentence is having on
his mental health?

(Appellant's brief, p. 3.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Caldwell failed to show that transcripts and exhibits never submitted
to or considered by the district court in relation to Caldwell's Rule 35
motion are necessary to create a record on appeal that is sufficient for
adequate appellate review of the denial of that motion?

2.

Has Caldwell failed to show error in the denial of Caldwell's Rule 35
motion and request for appointment of counsel because the district court
correctly decided that the motion for reconsideration of the sentence was
frivolous?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Caldwell's Claim That Denial Of His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record
With Irrelevant Items Was A Due Process Or Equal Protection Violation Is
Without Merit
A.

Introduction
The Idaho Supreme Court denied Caldwell's motion to augment with the

(as of yet unprepared) jury trial transcript from this case and exhibits, including a
transcript, from a different case. Caldwell contends that, because he is indigent,
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he is entitled to whatever record he wants unless "the state [proves his] request
is entirely frivolous." (Appellant's brief, p. 6.) Caldwell is wrong in his statement
of the legal standard. Due process and equal protection require the state only to
provide a record sufficient for appellate review of the errors alleged.

Because

none of the denied transcripts or documents are relevant to, much less
necessary for, appellate review of the denial of Caldwell's Rule 35 motion (the
only issue over which this Court has jurisdiction), Caldwell has failed to show any
error in the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of Caldwell's motion to augment.

2

The record in this case indicates that Caldwell earned $50,000 to $80,000 as a
contractor for years prior to his incarceration. (PSI, pp. 9-10.) He was
represented by retained counsel throughout the trial court proceedings
(excepting his Rule 35 motion, from which counsel withdrew). (R., pp. 40, 42, 48,
91, 106-07, 112-13, 125, 138, 197, 237, 282-85.) Caldwell's affidavit claiming
indigence is a form, and claims he has no funds or assets. (R., p. 270.) In his
motion to waive costs he lists $15,600 in assets, and a potential asset of $85,000
in the form of a lawsuit. (R., pp. 276-77.) He also lists several thousand dollars
in expenses that may apply to his family but certainly do not apply to him. (R.,
pp. 277-78.) His last tax refund, received about three months before he made
his application, was $5,000. (R., p. 278.) Because the district court did not rule
on whether Caldwell is in fact indigent (R., pp. 286-89), this issue would remain
to be decided if necessary upon remand.
4

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues such

as claimed due process violations is one of deference to factual findings, unless
they are clearly erroneous, but free review of whether constitutional requirements
have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375,
380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23
P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001 ).

C.

Caldwell Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement To The
Requested Augmentations
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is

sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the
proceedings below."

State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477

(2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372
U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms and Paroles,
357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). The state, however,
"will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide transcripts or
other items that "will not be germane to consideration of the appeal." Draper,
372 U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 112 n.5 (1996) ("an
indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial record that are
germane to consideration of the appeal" (internal citations omitted)); Lane, 372
U.S. 477; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12. To demonstrate that the record is not sufficient,
the defendant must show that any omissions from the record prejudiced his
ability to pursue the appeal. State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P.2d
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229, 234-35 (1968) (distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 148, 438 P.2d 893
(1968)). See also United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 2002). To
show prejudice Caldwell "must present something more than gross speculation
that the transcripts were requisite to a fair appeal." Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598,
605 (6th Cir. 2002).
This case is indistinguishable from State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 50
P.3d 472 (2002). In that case the Idaho Supreme Court stated the relevant legal
standards and concluded that the transcript of a hearing on a Rule 35 motion in
which there were no witnesses called was not necessary to conduct an adequate
appellate review. 19..,. at 462-63, 50 P.3d at 477-78. "When a motion to reduce
sentence is supported solely by documentary evidence and no hearing is held,
the denial of that motion can be adequately reviewed on appeal based on the
evidence in the record."

1sl at 463, 50 P.3d at 478.

Here the appellate record is adequate because, as in Strand, it contains
all of the evidence submitted in support of the Rule 35 motion. (R., pp. 255-65.)
Because there was no timely appeal from the original judgment, this Court lacks
appellate jurisdiction over the originally imposed sentence and will confine its
review to whether new evidence presented in support of the Rule 35 motion
demonstrated the sentence to be excessive. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007) ("Rule 35 does not function as an appeal of a
sentence.") Because none of the items requested augmented by Caldwell were
before the district court in deciding the Rule 35 motion, they are not germane and
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are instead unnecessary for appellate review under the rationale and holding of
Strand.
Caldwell ignores Strand.

(Appellant's brief, pp. iv-vi.)

Instead, citing

Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), he claims if he makes a
"colorable argument" that he needs an "item" to complete a record the burden
transfers to the state to show the "item" is unnecessary. (Appellant's brief, p. 9.)
He further argues, with no citation whatsoever, that to deny him any requested
transcript or other augmentation "the state must prove [his] request is entirely
frivolous." (Appellant's brief, p. 6.)

No reading of Mayer supports these legal

arguments.
Mayer was convicted on non-felony charges punishable only by a fine and
appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence and asserting a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct.

kl at

190. The appellate court denied his request for

a trial transcript at government expense on the basis of a local rule providing that
verbatim transcripts of trial proceedings would be provided at government
expense only for felonies.

kl

at 191-93. The issue was not whether Mayer was

entitled to a record of his trial, but whether he was entitled to a verbatim
transcript of his trial.

kl

at 193. The Court noted it had addressed a similar

issue in Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), where the Court held that
the government need not provide transcripts that were not '"germane to
consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds
unnecessarily in such circumstances."' Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper,
372 U.S. at 495-96).

However, "the State must provide a full verbatim record
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where that is necessary to assure the indigent as effective an appeal as would be
available to the defendant with resources to pay his own way."

!fl

at 195.

"Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable
need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a
portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on
those grounds."

!fl

Thus, if it is not clear on the existing record, an indigent appellant must
establish that a record of certain "proceedings" is germane to the appeal.

!fl at

194. Only after the germaneness of the requested record of the proceedings is
established and a colorable need for a verbatim record is shown by the appellant
will the burden shift to the state to demonstrate that a partial transcript or some
record other than a verbatim transcript will be adequate.

!fl at

194-95. See also

Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227-28 (1971) (in deciding whether
requested record necessary court should consider the "value of the transcript to
the defendant in connection with the appeal," but standard does not require "a
showing of need tailored to the facts of the particular case" and the court may
take notice of the importance of a transcript).
Here the proceeding challenged on appeal is the denial of Caldwell's Rule
35 motion. The record related to the denial of the Rule 35 motion is already
complete because all the evidence considered by the district court is before the
appellate court.

Strand, 137 Idaho at 463, 50 P.3d at 478.

It is Caldwell's

appellate burden of establishing that the requested transcripts and other
documents related to different trial court proceedings are necessary to create an
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adequate appellate record to review the denial of his Rule 35 motion.

The

augmentations he sought, however, were of different proceedings: a trial (the
verdict and resulting judgment of which are beyond the appellate jurisdiction of
this Court), and exhibits from and a transcript of a sentencing in an entirely
different case. Nothing in the record even suggests that the trial transcript or the
exhibits from the different case were before the district court in relation to the
Rule 35 motion. Having failed to make a showing of germaneness and colorable
need of the trial transcript or exhibits and transcript from a different case, there is
no burden on the state.
None of the requested augmentations are necessary for appellate review
of the denial of Caldwell's Rule 35 motion because none of the items Caldwell
seeks to augment were actually before the district court in relation to the Rule 35
motion. All of the evidence before the district court in relation to the Rule 35
motion is currently before the appellate court. (R., pp. 255-65.) Because all of
the evidence before the district court is in the appellate record, that record is
adequate for appellate review.

Strand, 137 Idaho at 463, 50 P.3d at 478.

In

rendering a decision on the issues raised on appeal, the appellate court is
"limited to review of the record made below" and "will not consider new evidence
that was never before the trial court." State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376 n.1,
859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Huerta v. Huerta, 127 Idaho 77,
80, 896 P.2d 985, 988 (Ct. App. 1995) ("It is not the role of this Court to entertain
new allegations of fact and consider new evidence."). Because the trial transcript
and the Reed exhibits and transcript were never presented to the district court in

9

relation to the Rule 35 motion, they were never part of the record before the
district court in considering the Rule 35 motion and are not properly considered
for the first time on appeal.
Caldwell asserts that because the district court stated at his sentencing
that Caldwell's circumstances and culpability were different than co-defendant
Reed's, the PSI, PSE, APSI and transcript from Reed's case must be necessary
for appellate review of his Rule 35 motion. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11.)

He

further speculates that because the district court found at sentencing that
Caldwell's trial testimony was untrue and manipulative that the trial transcript will
assist him on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-13.) The flaw in this argument is
that Caldwell could have challenged the district court's sentencing findings by
appealing from the judgment or by raising these claims in his Rule 35 motion, but
he did not. (R., pp. 255-65.) It was his burden to present, in conjunction with his
Rule 35 motion, evidence showing such error in the sentencing. See Huffman,
144 Idaho at 203, 159 P .3d at 840 (where appellant does not appeal from
judgment he must present evidence in conjunction with his Rule 35 motion
showing an abuse of discretion). Caldwell is effectively asking this Court to admit
and consider new evidence so that he can, for the first time on appeal, challenge
factual findings of the district court that he did not challenge in his Rule 35 motion
and which were made in relation to a judgment that this Court lacks jurisdiction to
review.

Caldwell's argument that the Constitution entitles him to such

augmentation is without merit.
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Caldwell is entitled to a record adequate for appellate review of the denial
of his Rule 35 motion. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that such a record is
adequate when it contains all the evidence presented in support of the motion.
Strand, 137 Idaho at 462-63, 50 P.3d at 477-78. Caldwell does not address the
applicable Idaho authority and his arguments are unsupported by the authority he
does cite.

Caldwell has failed to show that the denied augmentations are

relevant to appellate review, much less that they are necessary for adequate
appellate review.

II.
Caldwell Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of Caldwell's Rule 35 Motion
And Request For Appointment Of Counsel Because The District Court Correctly
Decided That The Motion For Reconsideration Of The Sentence Was Frivolous

A.

Introduction
Caldwell filed a motion for reduction of sentence asserting his family was

"having a very difficult time emotionally and financially" while he was incarcerated
and that he wanted to get programming for his alcohol abuse outside of prison.
(R., pp. 256-62.) He supported his petition with a letter from his wife.

(R., p.

264.) The district court denied the motion and the request for counsel after it
determined this was not "new material of any consequence" because it had been
addressed at sentencing and therefore the motion was frivolous.

(R., pp. 287-

88.) Caldwell contends that the information he provided was new, and his motion
not frivolous, because the district court did not have before it at sentencing
evidence of exactly how his confinement ultimately affected his family or his
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rehabilitation prospects.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 23-25.)

Caldwell's argument is

without merit.

B.

Standard Of Review
Denial of court appointed counsel under I.C. § 19-852(b)(3) is "within the

court's discretion" as long as "the court appropriately finds that the claims
presented are frivolous."

Swisher v. State, 129 Idaho 467, 468-69, 926 P.2d

1314, 1315-16 (Ct. App. 1996) (addressing appointment of counsel in postconviction proceedings).

C.

Because Caldwell's Rule 35 Motion Was Frivolous, The District Court Did
Not Err By Denying The Motion Or The Request For Counsel
A criminal defendant has the statutory right to counsel at all stages of the

criminal process, including pursuit of a Rule 35 motion.

Murray v. State, 121

Idaho 918, 923 n.3, 828 P.2d 1323, 1328 n.3 (Ct. App. 1992). However, the trial
court may deny appointment of counsel if the Rule 35 motion is frivolous or one
that a reasonable person with adequate means would not be willing to bring at
his or her own expense.

I.C. § 19-852(b)(3).

A determination of whether a

motion for reduction of sentence is frivolous for purposes of applying I.C. § 19852(b)(3) is based on the contents of the motion itself and any accompanying
documentation that may support the motion. State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 525,
873 P.2d 167, 270 (Ct. App. 1994). Thus, a district court is within its discretion to
deny a request for court appointed counsel under I.C. § 19-852(b )(3) if it
appropriately finds, after reviewing the contents of the motion, that the claims
presented are frivolous. Swisher, 129 Idaho at 468-69, 926 P.2d at 1315-16.
12

To prevail on ~iis motion, Caldwell had the burden of "show[ing] that the
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." Huffman, 144
Idaho at 202, 159 P.3d at 839. Review of the record shows that Caldwell did not
meet this burden, both because the information was not new and because, even
if new, it failed to show that the sentences were anything other than lenient.
The district court engaged in careful weighing of all the relevant facts and
factors at sentencing. (Tr., p. 52, L. 15-p. 69, L. 21.) The nature of the crimes
Caldwell committed was horrible and pervasive, involving sexual activities with
three victims barely teenaged or younger, often plying them with alcohol. (PSI,
pp. 2-3, 18-25, 56-57.)

All things considered, ordering seven concurrent

sentences that allow for parole in three years (R, pp. 232-34) was extremely
lenient.

The district court rightly found that a motion to reduce the sentences

based on the claims that Caldwell (1) was no longer providing an income to his
family due to his incarceration and (2) believed that he would rehabilitate faster
outside of prison was not a motion a reasonable person would pursue with his
own funds. (R., p. 287.)
Caldwell claims that the information he provided is new in the sense that it
was impossible to know at the time of sentencing exactly how his incarceration
would affect his family and mental health and what programming he would get at
the prison.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 23-25.) As found by the district court, the

information is not new because the district court was aware at sentencing of the
likely effects of Caldwell's incarceration. (R., pp. 287-88.) Even if the information
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could be considered "new," Caldwell makes no argument how this "new"
information makes this the sort of motion that a reasonable person would pay his
own money to pursue.
The motion had no chance of success.

It contained no truly new

information because it can come as no surprise to anyone that incarceration
makes financially supporting a family more difficult or that defendants might be
dissatisfied with the conditions of confinement. Even if the information was "new"
in the sense that the exact details of the effects of incarceration became known,
such is an unpersuasive reason to reduce already lenient sentences under the
facts of this case. Caldwell has failed to show error.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the Idaho Supreme
Court's denial of augmentation and the trial court's denial of the motion for
counsel and the motion for leniency.

DATED this 11th day of January, 2012.
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